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Abstract
Many important values for cooperative games are known to arise from
least square optimization problems. The present investigation develops an
optimization framework to explain and clarify this phenomenon in a general
setting. The main result shows that every linear value results from some
least square approximation problem and that, conversely, every least square
approximation problem with linear constraints yields a linear value.
This approach includes and extends previous results on so-called least
square values and semivalues in the literature. In particular, is it demon-
strated how known explicit formulas for solutions under additional assump-
tions easily follow from the general results presented here.
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1 Introduction
Approximation of high-dimensional quantities or complicated functions by sim-
pler functions with linear properties from low-dimensional spaces has countless
applications in physics, economics, operations research etc. In these applications,
the quality of the approximation is usually measured by the Gaussian principle of
least squared error, which is also the guiding optimality criterion in the present
investigation. Our study addresses a particular case of such an approximation
context with many applications in different fields related to operations research,
namely decision theory, game theory and the theory of pseudo-Boolean functions.
Where N is a finite set with n = |N | elements and collection 2N of subsets,
a set function v : 2N → R assigns to every subset of N a real number, and is by
definition of exponential complexity (in n). Identifying subsets of N with their
characteristic (incidence) vectors (and thus 2N with {0, 1}n), a set function can
be viewed as a so-called pseudo-Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → R (cf. Hammer
and Rudeanu [10]). Of particular interest are those set functions which vanish on
the empty set, since they represent cooperative TU games with N being the set
of players and the quantities v(S) expressing the benefit created by the coopera-
tion of the members of S ⊆ N (see, e.g., Peleg and Sudho¨lter [12]). Under the
additional stipulation of monotonicity, i.e., the property that v(S) ≤ v(T ) holds
whenever S ⊆ T , one arrives at so-called capacities, which are a fundamental
tool in the analysis of decision making under uncertainty (cf. Schmeidler [15]) or
relative to several criteria (Grabisch and Labreuche [6]).
Being of exponential complexity, a natural question is to try to approximate
general set functions by simpler functions, the simplest being the additive set func-
tions, which are completely determined by the value they take on the n singleton
sets {i} and are thus of linear complexity (in n). In the field of pseudo-Boolean
functions, the question has been addressed by Hammer and Holzman [8] with
respect to linear and quadratic approximations, while approximation of degree
k was studied by Grabisch et al. [7]. In decision theory, linear approximation
amounts to the approximation of a capacity µ by a probability measure P (an
additive capacity satisfying the additional constraint that P (N) = 1).
In game theory, the approximation of a game v by an additive game (equiva-
lently by a (payoff) vector in RN ) is related to the concept of value or solution of
a game: given v, find x ∈ RN such that
∑
i∈N xi = v(N) and the xi represent as
faithfully as possible the contribution of the individual players i in the total benefit
v(N). A very natural approach for a value is to define it as the best least square
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approximation of v, under the constraint
∑
i∈N xi = v(N), the approximation be-
ing possibly weighted. Such values are called least square values. An early and
important contribution to this cooperative solution concept is due to Charnes et al.
[2], who gave the general solution for the weighted approximation with nonneg-
ative weights, and exhibited the well-known Shapley value [16] as a least square
value. Ruiz et al. [13], for example, generalized this approach and derived further
values from least square approximation.
The aim of this paper is to provide a general view on the set function approxi-
mation problem by placing it in the context of quadratic optimization and bringing
well-known tools of convex analysis to bear on the problem. This approach not
only generalizes existing results but also points to interesting connections and
facts. Our formulation will remain general, although we will adopt most of the
time the notation and ideas from cooperative game theory, due to the great interest
in this field towards values and how to obtain them.
Our main result exhibits, roughly speaking, linear values and least square val-
ues for cooperative games to represent two sides of the same coin: we find that
every least square problem under linear constraints yields a linear value and that
every linear value arises as such a least square value (Section 3).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the general problem of
least square approximation and gives the fundamental result which will be used
in the sequel (Theorem 2.1). Section 4 concentrates on least square values, and
establishes explicit solution formulas under mild conditions on the weights used in
the approximation. This model generalizes the approach to the Shapley value and
to an optimization problem given in Ruiz et al. [13]. We remark that, interestingly,
the weights do not necessarily have to be all positive in our model. Finally, we
show in Section 5 how Weber’s [18] so-called probabilistic values arise naturally
in the present context.
2 Least square approximations and linear operators
We begin by reviewing some basic facts from convex optimization1. For integers
k,m ≥ 1, we denote by Rk the vector space of all k-dimensional (column) vectors
and by Rm×k the vector space of all (m×k)-matrices M = [mij ] with coefficients
mij . Generally, MT denotes the transpose of a matrix (or coefficient vector) M .
1see, e.g., Faigle et al. [4] or any other textbook for more details
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Recall that any positive definite (k × k)-matrix Q = [qij ] defines an inner
product via
〈x|y〉Q = x
TQy =
k∑
j=1
k∑
i=1
qijxiyj
with the associated Q-norm ‖x‖Q =
√
〈x|x〉Q on Rk. Note that the choice Q = I
of the identity matrix I yields the usual euclidian norm ‖x‖ = ‖x‖Q.
Fix now a matrix Am×k, a linear map b : Rk → Rm as well as a linear map
c : Rk → Rk. For any v ∈ Rk, denote by vˆ = vˆ(A, b, c) the optimal solution of
the quadratic minimization problem
min
Ax=b(v)
‖c(v)− x‖2Q. (1)
So, if the system Ax = b(v) of linear equations has at least one solution, vˆ is
the (uniquely determined) best approximation of c(v) in the solution space of
Ax = b(v) in the norm ‖ · ‖Q. The key observation in our analysis is:
Lemma 2.1 Assume that Ax = b(v) has a solution for every v ∈ Rk and that the
map c : Rk → Rk is linear. Then v 7→ vˆ is a well-defined linear operator.
Proof. Problem (1) is equivalent to the quadratic optimization problem
min
Ax=b(v)
1
2
xTQx− c(v)Tx. (2)
Given that Q is positive definite, it is well-known that x is the unique optimal
solution for problem (2) if and only if there is a vector y such that the associated
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) system
Qx + ATy = c(v)
Ax = b(v)
(3)
is satisfied. Since b and c are linear functions in v, one immediately deduces from
(3) that also the optimal solutions of (1) are linear functions in v.
⋄
Theorem 2.1 The operator f : Rk → Rk is linear if and only if there is a matrix
A ∈ Rm×k, a linear function b : Rk → Rm and a linear function c : Rk → Rk
such that Ax = b(v) is always solvable and f(v) = vˆ holds.
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Proof. Lemma 2.1 shows that the condition of the Theorem is sufficient for f
to be linear. Conversely, any f(v) is obviously the optimal solution of the problem
min
x∈Rk
‖f(v)− x‖2Q.
Hence the Theorem is satisfied with the choice A = 0 and b = 0, for example.
⋄
3 Values of cooperative games
Let N be a set of players of finite cardinality n = |N | and let N be the collection
of non-empty subsets S ⊆ N . A cooperative TU game is a function v : N → R
(which is usually thought to be extended to all subsets of N via v(∅) = 0). So the
set G = RN of all cooperative TU games on N is a vector space and isomorphic
to Rk with k = |N | = 2n − 1.
The additive (cooperative) games correspond to those members x ∈ RN that
satisfy the homogeneous system of linear equations
x(S)−
∑
i∈S
xi = 0 (S ∈ N )
and one may be interested in the approximation of a game v ∈ G by an additive
game with certain properties. More general approximations might be of interest.
For example, the linear constraints∑
i∈N
xi = v(N)
∑
S∈N
x(S) =
∑
S∈N
v(S)
would stipulate an approximation of v by a game that induces an efficient value
(the first equality) and, furthermore, preserves the total sum of the v(S) (second
equality). Since the right-hand-side constraints are linear in v Lemma 2.1 says
that least square approximations of this type are linear in v.
A function Φ : G → RN is value for G. It is straightforward, to view Φ(v)
actually as an additive game that assigns the worth ΦS(v) to the set S of players
by setting
ΦS(v) =
∑
i∈S
Φi(v) (S ∈ N ).
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Conversely, every additive game v arises from a parameter vector ϕ ∈ RN so that
v(S) =
∑
i∈S
ϕi (S ∈ N ).
Hence the space of additive games is isomorphic with RN . Consequently, The-
orem 2.1 implies that the linear values are those which arise from least square
approximation problems with linear constraints.
4 Least square values
We have seen that every linear value Φ : G → RN can be interpreted as arising
from a least square approximation problem. Special cases of seemingly more
general least square problems have received considerable attention in the literature
and led to the concept of least square values and semivalues. Take, for example,
the weighted least square problem
min
x∈RN
∑
S∈N
αS(v(S)− x(S))
2 s.t.
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N), (4)
where we set x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi. So (4) asks for the best (α-weighted) least square
approximation of a game v by an additive game x under the additional efficiency
constraint x(N) = v(N).
This problem has a long history. Hammer and Holzman ([8])2 studied both the
above version and the unconstrained version with equal weights (αS = 1 ∀S), and
proved that the optimal solutions of the unconstrained version yield the Banzhaf
value [1] (see also Section 5 below). More general versions of the unconstrained
problem were solved by Grabisch et al. [7] with the approximation being relative
to the space of k-additive games (i.e., games whose Mo¨bius transform vanishes
for subsets of size greater than k)3.
In 1988, Charnes et al. [2] gave a solution for the case with the coefficients
αS being uniform (i.e., αS = αT whenever |S| = |T |) and strictly positive. As a
particular case, the Shapley value was shown to result from the coefficient choice
αS = αs =
(
n− 2
s− 1
)
=
(n− 2)!
(s− 1)!(n− 1− s)!
(s = |S|). (5)
2later published in [9]
3see also Ding [3], and Marichal and Mathonet [11]
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REMARK. Ruiz et al. [13] state that problem (4) has a unique optimal solu-
tion for any choice of weights (see Theorem 3 there). In this generality, however,
the statement is not correct as neither the existence nor the uniqueness can be
guaranteed. So additional assumptions on the weights must be made.
We will first present a general framework for dealing with such situations and
then illustrate it with the example of regular weight approximations and proba-
bilistic values.
4.1 Weighted approximation
For the sake of generality, consider a general linear subspace F ⊆ RN of dimen-
sion k = dimF , relative to which the approximation will be made.
LetW = [wST ] ∈ RN×N be a given matrix of weightswST . Let c : RN → RN
be a linear function and consider, for any game v, the optimization problem
min
u∈F
(v − u)W (v − u)T + c(v − u)T with c = c(v), (6)
which is equivalent with
min
u∈F
uWuT − c˜uT , (7)
where c˜ ∈ RN has the components c˜S = cS + 2
∑
T wSTvT . A further simpli-
fication is possible by choosing a basis B = {b1, . . . , bk} for F . With the identifi-
cation
x = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ R
k ←→ u =
k∑
i=1
xibi ∈ F ,
problem (7) becomes
min
x∈Rk
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
qijxixj −
k∑
i=1
cixi (8)
with the coefficients
qij =
∑
S
∑
T
wST bi(S)bj(T ) and ci =
∑
S
c˜Sbi(S).
Note that c : RN → Rk is a linear function.
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Let A ∈ Rm×k be a constraint matrix and b : RN → Rm a linear function
such that Ax = b(v) has a solution for every v ∈ RN . If Q = [qij ] ∈ Rk×k is
positive definite, the problem
min
x∈Rk
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
qijxixj −
k∑
i=1
cixi s.t. Ax = b (9)
has a unique optimal solution x∗ which is linear in v (Lemma 2.1). So we obtain
the linear value v 7→ vˆ with components
vˆj = u
∗
{j} (j ∈ N) , where u∗ =
k∑
i=1
x∗i bi ∈ F .
In the model (4), for example, F is the space C of all additive games and has
dimension n. The matrix W is diagonal with the diagonal elements wSS = αS . If
αS > 0 holds for all S, then W is positive definite and the linearity of the implied
value v 7→ vˆ follows directly from Lemma 2.1.
Otherwise, let us choose for B the basis of unanimity games ζi, i ∈ N , for C,
where
ζi(S) =
{
1 if i ∈ S,
0 if i 6∈ S.
The associated matrix Q = [qij ] in model (4) has the coefficients
qij =
∑
S∈N
αSζi(S)ζj(S) =
∑
S∋{i,j}
αS. (10)
For establishing a linear value, it suffices that Q be positive definite, which is
possible even when some of the αS are negative (see Examples 4.1 and 4.2 below).
4.2 Regular weights
While Lemma 2.1 guarantees the existence of linear values resulting from ap-
proximation, explicit formulas can be given under additional assumptions on the
weights. Restricting ourselves to objectives of type∑
S∈N
αS(vS − uS)
2 +
∑
S∈N
cSuS,
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we propose a simple framework that nevertheless includes all the cases treated in
the literature so far. We say that the weights αS are regular if the resulting matrix
Q has just two types of coefficients qij , i.e., if there are real numbers p, q such that
qij =
{
q if i = j
p if i 6= j.
Example 4.1 Assume that the weights αS are uniform and set α(|S|) = αS . Then
formula (10) yields
qij =
n∑
s=2
(
n− 2
s− 2
)
α(s) and qii =
n∑
s=1
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
α(s)
holds for all i 6= j. So Q = [qij ] is regular.
Lemma 4.1 Let Q = [qii] ∈ Rk×k be regular with q = qii and p = qij for i 6= j.
Then Q is positive definite if and only if q > p ≥ 0.
Proof. For any x ∈ Rk, we have after some algebra
xTQx = (q − p)
k∑
i=1
x2i + px
2
where x =
∑n
i=1 xi, which makes the claim of the Lemma obvious.
⋄
Note that our model allows for possibly negative uniform coefficients, as shown
in the following example.
Example 4.2 Let n = 3. We get p = α2 + α3 and q = α1 + 2α2 + α3. Letting
α > 0, the following vectors (α1, α2, α3) lead to a positive definite matrix Q:
(0, α, 0), (α, 0, α), (0, α,−α), etc.
For the remainder of this section, let Q ∈ RN×N be a regular matrix with
parameters q > p ≥ 0, c ∈ RN a vector and g ∈ R a scalar. Setting 1T =
(1, 1, . . . , 1), the optimization problem
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min
x∈RN
xTQx− cTx s.t. 1Tx = x(N) = g (11)
has a unique optimal solution x∗ ∈ RN . Moreover, there is a unique scalar z∗ ∈ R
such that (x∗, z∗) is the unique solution of the associated KKT-system
Qx − z1 = c/2
1
Tx = g.
(12)
Verifying this KKT-system, the proof of the following explicit solution formu-
las is straightforward.
Theorem 4.1 If Q is regular, the solution (x∗, z∗) of the KKT-system (12) is:
z∗ = (2(q + (n− 1)p)g − C)/n (with C = c1T =∑i∈N ci)
x∗i = (ci + z
∗ − 2pg)/(2q − 2p) (i ∈ N).
If Q is furthermore positive definite, then x∗ is an optimal solution for (11).
⋄
In the case of uniform weights α(s), the formulas in Theorem 4.1 yield the
formulas derived by Charnes et al. [2] for problem (4). To demonstrate the scope
of Theorem 4.1, let us look at the extremal problem4 studied by Ruiz et al. [14]
min
x∈RN
∑
S⊆N
mSd(x, S)
2 s.t. x(N) = v(N), (13)
where mS > 0 and
d(x, S) =
v(S)− x(S)
|S|
−
v(N \ S)− x(N \ S)
n− |S|
.
Letting v∗(S) = v(N)− v(N \ S) and
v(S) =
(n− |S|)v(S) + |S|v∗(S)
n
(and thus nv(N) = v(N)), we find that problem (13) becomes
min
x∈RN
∑
S⊆N
αS(v(S)− x(S))
2 s.t. x(N) = nv(N).
4see also Sun et al. [17] for similar problems
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with αS = n2mS(|S|2(n− |S|)2)−1. Because v 7→ v and v 7→ g(v) = nv(N) are
linear mappings, the optimal solutions of (13) yield an efficient linear value for
any choice of parameters mS such that the associated matrix Q is positive definite.
If furthermore the weightsmS (and hence the αS) are uniform,Q is regular and
the optimal solution can be explicitly computed from the formulas of Theorem 4.1.
5 Probabilistic values
Weber [18] introduced the idea of a probabilistic value arising as the expected
marginal contribution of players relative to a probability distribution on the coali-
tions. For example, a semivalue is a probabilistic value relative to probabilities
that are equal on coalitions of equal cardinality.
For our purposes, it suffices to think of the marginal contribution of an element
i ∈ N as a linear functional ∂i : G → R, where ∂vi (S) is interpreted as the
marginal contribution of i ∈ N to the coalition S ⊆ N relative to the characteristic
function v.
Probabilistic values can be studied quite naturally in the context of weighted
approximations. Indeed, let p be an arbitrary probability distribution on N . Then
the expected marginal contribution of i ∈ N relative to the game v is
E(∂vi ) =
∑
S⊆N
∂vi (S)pS.
Let µi ∈ R be an estimate value for the marginal contribution of i ∈ N . Then
the expected observed deviation from µi is
σ(µi) =
√∑
S∈N
pS(∂vi (S)− µi)
2.
A well-known fact in statistics says that the deviation function µi 7→ σ(µi) has
the unique minimizer µ = E(∂vi ), which can also be immediately deduced from
the KKT conditions for the least square problem
min
µ∈R
∑
S∈N
pS(∂
v
i (S)− µ)
2.
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The values of Shapley and Banzhaf. Shapley’s [16] model assumes that player
i contributes to a coalition S only if i ∈ S holds and that, in this case, i’s marginal
contribution is evaluated as
∂vi (S) = v(S)− v(S \ i).
So only coalitions in Ni = {S ⊆ N | i ∈ S} need to be considered. In order to
speak about the ”average marginal contribution”, the model furthermore assumes:
(i) The cardinalities |X| of the coalitions X ∈ Ni are distributed uniformly.
(ii) The coalitions X ∈ Ni of the same cardinality |X| = s are distributed
uniformly.
Under these probabilistic assumptions, the coalition S ∈ Ni of cardinality
|S| = s occurs with probability
pS =
1
n
·
1(
n−1
s−1
) = (s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
, (14)
which exhibits the Shapley value as a probabilistic (and hence approximation)
value: ∑
S∈Ni
pS[v(S)− v(S \ i)] =
∑
S∈N
pS[v(S)− v(S \ i)] = Φ
Sh
i (v).
REMARK. Among the probabilistic values, the Shapley value can also be char-
acterized as the one with the largest entropy (Faigle and Voss [5]).
In contrast to the Shapley model, the assumption that all coalitions in Ni are
equally likely assigns to any coalition S ∈ Ni the probability
pS =
1
2n−1
(15)
with the Banzhaf value [1] as the associated probabilistic value:∑
S∈Ni
pS[v(S)− v(S \ i)] =
∑
S∈N
pS[v(S)− v(S \ i)] = B
v
i .
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